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Attempts to demonstrate unconscious processing are 
as old as experimental psychology itself (e.g., Peirce 
& Jastrow, 1884). Given this long history, it is puz-
zling  that  the  topic  appears  just  as  controversial 
today as it did decades ago (Erdelyi, 2004; Eriksen, 
1960; Holender, 1986; Holender & Duscherer, 2004). 
Paradoxically, this controversy does not so much con-
cern  the  existence  of  unconscious  processing  (most 
researchers  seem  to  be  convinced  of  this)  but  the 
question how to demonstrate unconscious processing 
in a given experiment.
Progress in the field has been handicapped by the 
unquestioned assumption that in order to demonstrate 
unconscious  processing,  one  has  to  make  sure  that 
a critical stimulus was completely outside of aware-
ness. In this contribution, I would like to propose two 
alternative lines of attack for establishing unconscious 
processing beyond the zero-awareness criterion. The 
first  part  of  the  paper  will  deal  with  different  types 
of dissociation between measures of awareness and 
measures of processing per se (Schmidt & Vorberg, 
2006).  The  conclusion  of  this  section  is  that  even 
though different methods are available, the most pow-
erful approach involves double dissociations where an 
experimental manipulation is shown to have opposite 
effects on the two measures. Surprisingly, it can be 
shown that this type of dissociation does not require, 
nor does it benefit from, unconscious stimuli. In the 
ABSTrAcT
Visual masking can be employed to manipulate 
observers’ awareness of critical stimuli in stud-
ies of masked priming. This paper discusses two 
different lines of attack for establishing uncon-
scious  cognition  in  such  experiments.  Firstly, 
simple  dissociations  between  direct  measures 
(D) of visual awareness and indirect measures 
(I) of processing per se occur when I has some 
nonzero value while D is at chance level; the tra-
ditional requirement of zero awareness is neces-
sary for this criterion only. In contrast, double 
dissociations  occur  when  some  experimental 
manipulation  has  opposite  effects  on  I  and  D, 
for instance, increasing priming effects despite 
decreasing  prime  identification  performance 
(Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). Double dissociations 
require much weaker measurement assumptions 
than  other criteria. An attractive alternative to 
this dissociation approach would be to use tasks 
that are known to violate necessary conditions 
of visual awareness altogether. In particular, it 
is argued here that priming effects in speeded 
pointing  movements  (Schmidt,  Niehaus,  &  Na-
gel, 2006) occur in the absence of the recurrent 
processing  that  is  often  assumed  to  be  a  nec-
essary  condition  for  awareness  (for  instance, 
DiLollo, Enns, & rensink, 2000; Lamme & roelf- 
sema,  2000).  Feedforward  tasks  such  as  this 
might thus be used to measure the time-course 
of  unconscious  processing  directly,  before  in-
tracortical  feedback  and  awareness  come  into 
play.
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second part of the paper, I will focus on the possibility 
of working out the necessary conditions for awareness: 
If these conditions be known, measures known to defy 
them could be used to measure unconscious process-
ing directly. As an illustration, I will argue that prim-
ing effects in speeded pointing movements (Schmidt, 
Niehaus, & Nagel, 2006) occur in the absence of the 
recurrent  processing  that  is  often  assumed  to  be 
a  necessary  condition  for  awareness  (for  instance, 
DiLollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Lamme, 2002; Lamme 
& Roelfsema, 2000; Tong, 2003).
Simple dissociations and the  
zero-awareness criterion
To demonstrate that a critical stimulus was processed 
unconsciously, one usually has to produce some dis-
sociation  between  different  behavioral  measures  of 
performance  concerning  that  stimulus.  Traditionally, 
this is done by comparing two measures obtained from 
different tasks.1 One measure (called the direct meas-
ure, D) is supposed to signal the observer’s awareness 
of the critical stimulus, for instance, in a forced-choice 
prime discrimination task. The second measure (called 
indirect measure, I) is used as an indicator that the 
stimulus was processed at all, for instance, a prim-
ing effect in reaction times. The traditional criterion 
for  unconscious  processing  has  required  D  to  equal 
zero, assuming that this signals the absence of any 
conscious  processing  of  the  critical  stimulus.  At  the 
same time, I is required to be nonzero, indicating that 
the stimulus was nevertheless processed (Reingold & 
Merikle, 1988; Shanks & St. John, 1994). Historically, 
this zero-awareness criterion has run into difficulties 
because  it  only  works  if  a  valid  conclusion  can  be 
drawn from zero performance in the direct measure 
to zero awareness in the observer (Reingold & Merikle, 
1988, 1990, 1993; Reingold, 2004).
Recently,  Dirk  Vorberg  and  I  have  examined  the 
scopes and assumptions required by the zero-awareness 
criterion as well as alternative approaches (Schmidt & 
Vorberg, 2006). We start from the assumption that di-
rect as well as indirect measures may depend on two 
sources of stimulus information which may be labeled 
“conscious” (c) and “unconscious” (u) without loss of 
generality: D = D(c, u), I = I(c, u), where information is 
defined non-negative. The dependency is supposed to 
be weakly monotonic, which means that if any type of 
information increases, the measures can only increase 
or remain constant (in the long run, that is, in the ex-
pected values). These are weak assumptions that must 
be conceded for virtually any measurement situation. 
Establishing  unconscious  processing  then  consists  in 
refuting a Null Model which states that the influence 
of  unconscious  information  is  zero,  or  equivalently, 
that both measures are driven by a single source of 
conscious information. If the null model is discarded, 
performance in the two tasks must be driven by at least 
one additional source of information.
There is one important constraint here. If D and I 
are to be modeled as functions of the same arguments 
c and u, one has to make sure that the underlying 
conscious and unconscious information is the same for 
both measures. Therefore, the direct and indirect tasks 
must  be  designed  to  use  identical  stimuli,  identical 
responses, and identical stimulus-response mappings 
(Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). In other words, D must 
address  exactly  that  stimulus  distinction  that  drives 
the  effect  in  the  indirect  task ( Reingold  &  Merikle, 
1988).  For  an  example  of  mismatch  between  direct 
and indirect tasks, consider the study by Dehaene et 
al. (1998). The indirect task was to indicate as quickly 
as  possible  whether  a  target  digit  was  numerically 
smaller or larger than five, where the target digit was 
preceded by a masked prime digit. Response times in 
this task were shorter when the prime was consistent 
with the target (i.e., both numbers < 5) than when 
the prime was inconsistent (i.e., prime < 5 but tar-
get > 5). The optimal direct task would have asked 
for the same feature discrimination, namely deciding 
whether  the  prime  was  larger  or  smaller  than  five, 
because this was the information driving the priming 
effect. Instead, the authors employed two direct tasks, 
detection of the primes against an empty background, 
and discrimination of the primes from random letter 
strings,  none  of  which  captured  the  critical  distinc-
tion of whether the prime was smaller or larger than 
five. A more subtle example is from the seminal study 
by Neumann and Klotz (1994). In the indirect task, 
participants  performed  a  speeded  discrimination  of 
whether a square was presented to the left or right 
of a diamond, so that each of the two stimulus alter-
natives was mapped onto exactly one response. This 
target pair was preceded by a smaller pair of diamond 
and  square  in  either  the  same  (consistent)  or  the 
reverse  (inconsistent)  configuration,  or  by  a  neutral 
prime pair (e.g., two diamonds). In the direct task, 
participants had to classify the prime pairs as neutral 
vs. non-neutral, such that the neutral prime pair was 
now mapped onto one response, and both remaining 
prime pairs onto the other response. Even though the 
direct  and  indirect  tasks  employed  identical  stimuli, 
the direct task used a more complex and presumably 
more difficult stimulus-response mapping.Measuring unconscious cognition: Beyond the zero-awareness criterion
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Given  that  D-I  mismatch  is  efficiently  avoided, 
how can the null model of only conscious processing 
be disproved? The traditional way of doing this is the 
zero-awareness criterion, which produces what we call 
a simple dissociation of direct and indirect measures: 
zero D in the presence of nonzero I (Figure 1). If we 
start from this finding, we quickly see that we don’t 
get very far without additional assumptions, because 
the observation that I(c, u) > 0 only implies that c > 0,   
u > 0, or both. Can we use the fact that D(c, u) = 0 
to make sure that c = 0? Not quite, because D(c, u) = 0 
does  not  imply  c  =  0  under  weak  monotonicity  as-
sumptions: D may simply fail to respond to changes 
in information, so that there could be some c that D 
was not able to detect. To work around this problem, 
we have to make the stronger assumption that D is an 
exhaustive measure of conscious information, that is, 
that D is a strictly monotonic function of c (Reingold 
&  Merikle,  1988;  see  Schmidt  &  Vorberg,  2006,  for 
a more general proof). This means that D is able to 
detect any change in c whatsoever, so that D(c, u) = 0 
implies c = 0. Given this exhaustiveness assumption, 
we can finally use the fact that c can no longer drive 
the indirect effect: I(c, u) = I(0, u) > 0 implies u > 0, 
which says that there is nonzero unconscious informa-
tion in the system.
How restrictive is the exhaustiveness assumption? 
It  requires  that  no  change  in  awareness,  however 
small, must escape detection by D; only then can we 
infer the absence of awareness from zero values in the 
direct measure. You may compare this with your old 
mechanical barometer which is likely to be a weakly 
monotonic measure of atmospheric air pressure: The 
needle of the barometer tends to rise with air pres-
sure, but it sometimes “hangs”, and you have to knock 
against the shell to break the needle free. A strictly 
monotonic, exhaustive measure of air pressure would 
be  an  infinitely  sensitive  barometer,  one  that  never 
hangs.  Strict  monotonicity  is  violated  by  conditions 
as trivial and inescapable as random error in the di-
rect measure. The exhaustiveness assumption is thus 
a  strong  requirement  that  should  not  be  taken  for 
granted. If the exhaustiveness assumption is wrong, 
it can always be argued that it was conscious process-
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Data patterns and assumptions necessary to interpret a simple dissociation as evidence for nonzero unconscious information. 
An arrow from information source a to measure B indicates that B is some function of a. S-shaped inset symbols denote that 
weak monotonicity is assumed for that function. Abbreviations as explained in main text. a) Data pattern required for a simple 
dissociation. Direct and indirect measures are plotted in an opposition space in effect size units. Evidence for a simple dis-
sociation is given by data points lying on the stippled vertical line such that I > 0 while D = 0. b) A simple dissociation gives 
evidence for nonzero unconscious information if it can be assumed that D is an exhaustive function of c and that I is a weakly 
monotonic function of u. c) Alternatively, a simple dissociation gives evidence for nonzero unconscious information if I is an 
exclusive measure of u. Adapted from Schmidt and Vorberg (2006).278
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ing alone that influenced both D and I, but that I was 
sensitive enough to detect it while D was not (Reingold 
& Merikle, 1988).
There are some other difficulties with simple disso-
ciations that are more on the practical side. One often 
stated problem is how to show statistically that D is 
not different from zero, because this involves “proving 
the null hypothesis”, which is a commonplace problem 
in scientific research. Actually, the solution to this is 
straightforward and requires establishing binding cri-
teria for effect, size, power, or confidence limits in the 
direct  measure  (Murphy  &  Myors,  1998).2  However, 
given the conservativeness of applied statistics, this is 
unlikely to happen soon. Another practical problem is 
that finding stimulus conditions that will yield chance 
performance in the direct task is difficult, and largely a 
matter of good luck.
There  is  an  alternative  set  of  assumptions  that 
abolishes  the  need  for  a  direct  measure  altogether 
(Fig. 1c). This is when the indirect measure can be 
assumed to be an exclusive measure of unconscious 
information, that is, a weakly monotonic function of u 
that is unaffected by c. In this case I(c, u) = I(u) > 0 
implies u > 0 directly.3 Tentative evidence for exclusive 
measures of unconscious processing is discussed later 
in this paper.
Beyond zero awareness I: Double 
dissociations
One interesting way to circumvent the exhaustiveness 
or exclusiveness assumptions is to let awareness vary 
over experimental conditions. It may then be possible 
to establish a double dissociation, which consists of 
finding an experimental manipulation that changes D 
and I in opposite directions (Figure 2). In particular, 
any pair of experimental conditions that leads to op-
posite orderings of data points in direct and indirect 
measures gives evidence for a double dissociation. An 
example would be a priming experiment with two (or 
more)  masking  conditions  where  the  priming  effect 
increases  over  experimental  conditions  while  prime 
identification performance decreases. It is intuitively 
clear that two measures of visual information going in 
opposite directions cannot be monotonically driven by 
a single information source, and a formal proof of this 
can be found in our paper (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006)4. 
Our  concept  of  double  dissociations  is  analogous  to 
the widely used methodology in neuropsychology and 
medicine (Shallice, 1988; Sternberg, 2001).
Double dissociations have surprising features (see 
Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006, for details). Firstly, they re-
quire D to be nonconstant: They cannot be obtained in 
the complete absence of awareness but require varia-
tion of awareness over a range of experimental condi-
tions, so that there must be nonzero awareness for 
the prime under at least some conditions. Secondly, 
double dissociations require weaker assumptions than 
simple dissociations: There is no need for an exhaus-
tiveness or an exclusiveness assumption, and we can 
even drop the assumption of weak monotonicity for 
all functions of u. Adopting the barometer metaphor 
from the last section, not only is the direct measure 
allowed to “hang” with respect to conscious informa-
tion, but neither direct nor indirect measures have to 
be monotonically related to unconscious information at 
all. Because of this, c and u are allowed to produce ar-
bitrary interactive effects on D and I like, for instance, 
when  c  and  u  are  mutually  inhibitory ( Snodgrass, 
Bernat,  &  Shevrin,  2004;  see  Schmidt  &  Vorberg, 
2006, for proof). The surprising outcome is thus that 
unconscious stimuli are not required for demonstrating 
unconscious processing.
Examples of simple as well as double dissociations 
come from experiments in response priming (Neumann 
&  Klotz,  1994;  see  also Ansorge  &  Neumann,  2005; 
Dehaene  et  al.,  1998;  Eimer  &  Schlaghecken,  1998, 
2003;  Jaśkowski,  van  der  Lubbe,  Schlotterbeck,  & 
Verleger,  2002; Klotz  &  Neumann,  1999; Leuthold  & 
Kopp,  1998; Mattler,  2003; Schmidt,  2002; Verleger, 
Jaśkowski, Aydemir, van der Lubbe, & Groen, 2004). 
In experiments by Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, 
and Schwarzbach (2003, 2004), participants performed 
speeded keypress responses to the direction of an ar-
row-shaped  masking  stimulus  that  was  preceded  by 
an arrow-shaped prime. The mask had a dual purpose 
here, acting as the target of the response and at the 
same time reducing visibility of the prime by metacon-
trast, a form of visual backward masking (Breitmeyer 
& Öğmen, 2006; Francis, 1997). As the stimulus-onset 
asynchrony (SOA) between prime and mask increased, 
priming effects also increased, such that primes point-
ing into the same direction as the mask shortened re-
sponse times, while primes pointing into the opposite 
direction prolonged them. Strikingly, this priming effect 
was independent of visual awareness of the prime. We 
determined this by using stimulus conditions that pro-
duced different time-courses of metacontrast masking. 
When a 17-ms prime was followed by a 140-ms mask, 
primes were virtually invisible, and participants were 
unable to perform better than chance when asked to 
discriminate the pointing direction of the prime (in over 
3,000  trials  per  participant).  These  findings  provide 
strong evidence for a simple dissociation as tradition-Measuring unconscious cognition: Beyond the zero-awareness criterion
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ally  required.  In  a  second  experiment,  however,  we 
compared all four pairings of short-duration (14 ms) 
and long-duration (42 ms) primes and masks, yielding 
very different types of masking functions. When 14-ms 
primes were combined with 42-ms masks, prime identi-
fication performance was low and slightly increased with 
SOA; performance was better when mask duration was 
reduced to 14 ms. When a 42-ms prime was paired with 
a 14-ms mask, prime identification performance was 
nearly perfect. However, a 42-ms prime combined with 
a 14-ms mask yielded an effect called type-B masking 
(Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006), where prime identifica-
tion performance markedly decreases with the prime-
mask SOA, then increases again. Still, the priming ef-
fect increased monotonically, producing a strong double 
dissociation between priming and prime identification 
performance. These data defy the claim that direct and 
indirect measures tend to convey similar amounts of 
information about the critical stimulus (Franz, 2006): 
Priming increased linearly with SOA no matter whether 
the prime was completely visible, completely invisible, 
or whether visibility increased or decreased with SOA. 
Clearly,  this  data  pattern  reveals  a  relationship  that 
would never have been found by simple dissociation: 
Response priming is independent of prime identification 
performance,  with  different  time-courses  in  the  two 
tasks.
There are further examples of double dissociations 
in masked priming studies. Mattler (2003) reports a 
series of experiments where not only motor responses 
were primed but also shifts in visual attention and task 
set.  Double  dissociations  were  evident  in  the  time-
course  of  linearly  increasing  priming  effects  under 
type-B masking conditions. Further examples of dou-
ble dissociations include Merikle and Joordens’ (1997a, 
b) demonstration of qualitative dissociations (Merikle 
& Cheesman, 1987). These authors used a variant of 
the Stroop (1935) task where participants responded 
to the color of red or green target stimuli (strings of 
ampersands) that were preceded by the prime words 
“RED”  or  “GREEN”.  The  regular  Stroop  effect  fea-
tures faster responses in consistent trials (e.g., “RED 
-  &&&&&&&”)  than  in  inconsistent  trials  (e.g.,  “RED 
- &&&&&&&”). However, when most of the primes are 
inconsistent with the target, participants often use the 
resulting  contingency  and  eventually  respond  faster 
in inconsistent than in consistent trials. However, the 
authors found this reversal only under conditions of 
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weak visual masking: When the primes were strongly 
masked, only the regular effect was observed. Such 
“qualitative dissociations” can be interpreted as spe-
cial cases of double dissociations (Schmidt & Vorberg, 
2006, mathematical appendix).
Searching for double dissociations has practical im-
plications. It requires setting up different conditions of 
prime visibility, thereby encouraging the employment 
of  parametric  experiments.  In  particular,  it  is  often 
advantageous to study the full time-course of prim-
ing and masking over the SOA range of interest, be-
cause sampling the priming process at only one point 
in time may lead to grossly misleading conclusions if 
the time-course changes across experimental condi-
tions (Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005). A similar point can 
be made for simple dissociations: Demonstrating that 
the direct measure is invariant over a range of condi-
tions despite marked changes in the indirect measure 
is often more convincing than looking at only one ex-
perimental condition and argue that D has a specific 
value, zero. Thus, even in cases where double disso-
ciations are hard to find, parametric experimentation 
can do a lot to improve the cogency of the data. Visual 
masking procedures that lead to decreases in visibility 
with increasing prime-mask SOA (for example, DiLollo 
et al., 2000; Francis, 1997; Francis & Herzog, 2004) 
are of special interest for the establishment of double 
dissociations.5
Beyond zero awareness II: 
Violating necessary conditions for 
awareness
Dissociations at the task level are able to provide only 
indirect evidence for a distinction of underlying proc-
esses. An exciting alternative would be to work out the 
necessary conditions for visual awareness and then try 
to find behavioral tasks that violate those conditions. 
In other words, we could search for indirect measures 
that are exclusive measures of unconscious process-
ing.
In a metaanalysis of 48 studies investigating the 
response latencies of various cortical areas to a sud-
den  visual  stimulus,  Lamme  and  Roelfsema  (2000) 
showed that the stimulus creates a wave of activation 
traveling  from  posterior  to  anterior  areas,  reaching 
most  cortical  areas  within  about  150  ms,  including 
prefrontal  and  primary  motor  cortices.  The  authors 
estimated  that  this  leaves  cells  with  only  about  10 
milliseconds’ time to pass their own activation on to 
later areas, which is about the duration of a typical in-
terspike interval. Therefore, if most cells have to pass 
on their activation with the next spike fired, there is 
little or no time to integrate feedback from other cells. 
Based on this, Lamme and Roelfsema suggested that 
the first wave of visual activation travels through the 
system as a fast feedforward sweep whose wavefront 
is essentially free of intracortical feedback information. 
This is well in line with behavioral measurements from 
rapid  stimulus  classification  tasks  as  well  as  neural 
network simulations, which suggest that most of the 
stimulus-relevant information could be extracted from 
the temporal distribution of the very first spikes in the 
feedforward  wavefront,  (Kirchner  &  Thorpe,  2006; 
Rousselet, Fabre-Thorpe, & Thorpe, 2002; VanRullen & 
Koch, 2003; VanRullen & Thorpe, 2002).6
Lamme and Roelfsema (2000; Lamme, 2002) as-
sume that feedforward processing alone is not suffi-
cient for generating visual awareness. Along with sev-
eral other authors (for instance, DiLollo et al., 2000; 
Tong, 2003), they propose that conscious perception 
is possible only with recurrent processing of the stimu-
lus. Evidence for this view comes from studies indicat-
ing that visual awareness of a stimulus is suppressed if 
feedback loops from extrastriate visual areas through 
primary visual cortex are disrupted at critical points in 
time, for instance, by a visual backward mask (Bacon-
Macé, Macé, Fabre-Thorpe, & Thorpe, 2005; Lamme, 
Zipser, & Spekreijse, 2002; Macknik & Haglund, 1999; 
Macknik & Livingstone, 1998) or by transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001; Ro, 
Breitmeyer, Burton, Singhal, & Lane, 2003). This view 
would be able to explain the major findings in response 
priming:  Priming  could  reflect  visuomotor  activation 
transmitted by the fast feedforward sweeps initiated 
by primes and masks before recurrent processes set in 
to gradually wipe out the prime signal before it enters 
visual awareness. The feedforward processes associ-
ated with priming should therefore be independent of 
the recurrent processes leading to visual awareness 
and  backward  masking,  which  is  nicely  compatible 
with the double-dissociation findings by Vorberg et al. 
(2003, 2004) and Mattler (2003) as well as the abun-
dant evidence from simple dissociations.
To convincingly link response priming to feedforward 
processing, one has to show that visuomotor activation 
is not only transmitted rapidly, but that the dynamics 
of this transmission are consistent with a feedforward 
process. Evidence for rapid visuomotor transmission 
in masked priming comes from the study of primed 
pointing responses (Schmidt, 2002; see also Brenner 
&  Smeets,  2004).  In  that  study,  participants  were 
presented with one red and one green prime flashed 
simultaneously in opposite quadrants of the display, Measuring unconscious cognition: Beyond the zero-awareness criterion
281
http://www.ac-psych.org
followed by one red and one green metacontrast mask 
(annuli that closely fitted around the primes) at the 
same locations as the primes (Figure 3a). Primes and 
masks  at  corresponding  positions  could  either  have 
the same colors (consistent primes), or prime colors 
could be switched compared to mask colors (inconsist-
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ent  primes).  Participants  had  to  point  as  quickly  as 
possible from the fixation point towards the mask with 
appointed color (Mask ID task, designed to measure 
response  priming  effects),  or  tried  to  point  without 
time pressure to the position where they believed the 
prime of that color had occurred (Prime ID task, de-
signed to assess visual awareness of the primes).
Results  clearly  showed  that  responses  were  con-
trolled consecutively by prime and mask signals even 
when  the  primes  were  completely  masked.  Pointing 
responses started at a fixed time following prime onset 
and initially went into the direction specified by the 
primes, even though the mask signals were the ac-
tual targets of the response. When primes and masks 
were consistent, this initial direction was correct, and 
the finger simply travelled towards the correct mask 
until the response was completed. When primes and 
masks were inconsistent, however, the finger initially 
traveled into the quadrant occupied by the misleading 
prime. This detour into the wrong quadrant lasted for 
a time depending on prime-mask SOA; then the finger 
stopped and finally proceeded in the correct direction. 
These data suggest that pointing movements are un-
der continuous control of the color stimuli responded 
to: Prime signals reach motor areas of the brain in ad-
vance of the mask signals, governing the initial phase 
of the pointing response, whereas mask signals are 
able to take control in mid-flight with a delay depend-
ing on the prime-mask SOA. Moreover, these signals 
seem to travel fast enough to escape visual masking 
processes,  because  priming  effects  occurred  even 
when prime ID performance was at chance.
So  far,  these  results  only  tell  us  that  response 
control  in  primed  pointing  movements  occurs  very 
rapidly, but is it purely feedforward? If the notion of 
a feedforward sweep is applied strictly, each cell first 
reached by the feedforward wavefront can respond to 
it only on the basis of its preestablished input-output 
properties (its classical receptive field). The feedfor-
ward hypothesis in this strong form is controversial, 
because feedback mechanisms in early visual areas 
can  be  very  rapid  (Bullier,  2001;  Girard,  Hupé,  & 
Bullier,  2001),  and  there  are  many  possibilities  for 
signals processed in parallel visual streams to cross 
or overtake each other well before the first overt signs 
of motor activation (Merigan & Maunsell, 1993). It is 
therefore worthwhile to step back a bit and focus at 
the input-output dynamics of the system as a whole 
instead of claiming purely feedforward processing in 
all its subcomponents. To do this, we introduced the 
concept of a rapid chase (Schmidt et al., 2006). This 
concept applies to visuomotor tasks where sequential 
visual  stimuli  run  for  control  of  the  same  speeded 
motor response – for instance, when a pointing re-
sponse is initiated by one stimulus and then altered 
in  mid-flight  by  an  immediately  following  stimulus 
(Brenner & Smeets, 2004; Schmidt, 2002). By our 
definition, two successive visuomotor signals are said 
to be engaged in a rapid chase if 
(1) the response is initiated by the first stimulus, 
(2) the response is influenced by the second stimu-
lus before it is completed, and
(3) the response to the first stimulus is initially in-
dependent of the second stimulus.
These  rapid-chase  criteria  say  that  if  successive 
signals are in a rapid chase, they will take strictly suc-
cessive control over the same motor response, such 
that the response will initially be controlled by the first 
stimulus alone. The third criterion is crucial because it 
demands sequential stimulus signals to exert strictly 
sequential response control.
We  adopted  the  pointing  task  used  by  Schmidt 
(2002),  employing  two  different  types  of  masking 
stimuli, which could either be efficient annular meta-
contrast  masks  fitting  snugly  around  the  prime,  or 
thin annular pseudomasks that left a large gap around 
the outer contours of the prime (Figure 3b). We also 
varied the overall color contrast of all stimuli (primes 
and masks together). Results replicated all the basic 
findings reported earlier (Schmidt, 2002) and met all 
three of the rapid-chase criteria. Firstly, responses to 
the mask stimuli were actually triggered by the prime, 
as shown by the fact that pointing onset was time-
locked to prime rather than mask onset and that the 
finger  tended  to  detour  into  the  quadrant  occupied 
by the misleading prime. Secondly, mask stimuli took 
over the response in midflight, so that even responses 
detouring into the wrong direction were captured after 
a time depending on the prime-mask SOA and redi-
rected into the correct direction.
To  assess  the  validity  of  the  crucial  third  crite-
rion (the response’s initial independence of the mask 
stimulus), we derived a spatial measure of the priming 
effect by subtracting the finger positions in consist-
ent and inconsistent trials. (This measure tells us how 
far the finger position in inconsistent trials lags behind 
the finger position in consistent trials at corresponding 
points in time.) For both high-contrast and low-contrast 
color stimuli, spatial priming effects started to develop 
at a time locked to prime onset, and priming effects 
became  larger  for  longer  SOAs  and  weaker  masks 
(Figure 4). Strikingly, however, all these priming func-
tions were initially the same, neatly conforming to our 
third rapid-chase criterion: The early time-courses of Measuring unconscious cognition: Beyond the zero-awareness criterion
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priming were virtually identical for all combinations of 
mask type and SOA, exclusively depending on charac-
teristics of the prime but being completely independ-
ent of all mask characteristics.7
To see the significance of this invariance, which was 
obvious in each participant, consider a general model 
of priming where the pointing movement at the on-
set of the priming effect is controlled by information 
coming from the mask as well as the prime, indicat-
ing an early mixture of signals. Under such a model, 
the initial slopes of the priming trajectories should be 
smaller for shorter prime-mask SOAs and for stronger 
masks, because these factors should increase the in-
fluence of the mask signal relative to the prime signal 
and thus reduce the priming effect. In other words, 
the presence of recurrent information in the earliest 
parts of the motor signal would be expected to contain 
information from the mask and therefore to dampen 
the early time-course of the priming effect. In con-
trast, the finding that this time-course is initially in-
variant indicates that the mask signal has no influence 
whatsoever at the time when the prime first affects 
the pointing movement. This finding strongly suggests 
that early priming effects are based on signals carry-
ing only prime but no mask information.
Data from primed pointing movements thus meet 
all our requirements for a rapid chase: Sequentially 
presented visual signals control pointing movements 
in  a  strictly  sequential  fashion,  and  the  prime-  and 
mask-triggered visuomotor signals never seem to mix. 
This finding provides independent behavioral evidence 
for an early phase of visuomotor processing that is at 
least primarily if not entirely feedforward (Lamme & 
Roelfsema, 2000)8. At the same time, it establishes re-
sponse priming of pointing movements (and presum-
ably a much larger class of speeded visuomotor tasks) 
as a candidate for a feedforward task that proceeds 
in  the  absence  of  recurrent  processing.  If  recurrent 
activity really turns out to be a necessary condition for 
visual awareness, such feedforward tasks should be 
devoid of conscious information, that is, be exclusive 
measures of unconscious processing.
Where do we go from here?
In  this  paper  I  have  argued  for  two  very  different 
strategies  to  circumvent  the  difficulties  associated 
with the zero-awareness criterion. One way is to find 
dissociation  patterns  that  go  beyond  that  criterion. 
If  a  double  dissociation  between  direct  and  indirect 
measures can be established, this provides an even 
stronger  argument  for  unconscious  processing  than 
does the traditional simple dissociation, because the 
double dissociation approach rests on much milder as-
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sumptions (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). An exciting and 
increasingly viable alternative is to use accumulating 
evidence from behavioral neuroscience about the nec-
essary conditions for visual awareness, for instance, 
the requirement for recurrent processing. Behavioral 
measures could then be developed that are known to 
violate these conditions, for instance, by meeting the 
rapid-chase criteria (Schmidt et al., 2006). This ap-
proach does not hinge on finding tricky dissociation 
patterns or by leaning heavily on measurement-theo-
retical assumptions, but on gradually converging evi-
dence from neuroanatomy, physiology, psychophysics, 
and behavioral measurement.
It is still unclear how far the recurrent-processing 
hypothesis will actually carry, and for the time being, 
the dissociation approach is probably still the safer bet. 
But measurement theory can only take us so far. In or-
der to use dissociations for demonstrating unconscious 
processing, one has to work from the assumption that 
the “conscious/unconscious” distinction is valid in the 
first place. All that dissociations can teach us is that a 
single source of information is not sufficient to explain 
the data, including a single source of “conscious” infor-
mation. But the insight that there must be at least two 
sources does not by itself imply that one of them is 
unconscious: There might be two dissociable types of 
conscious (or unconscious) information. One reviewer 
of this article asked whether this wouldn’t render the 
search for double dissociations a fruitless exercise - if 
true, of course, this conclusion would hold for simple 
as well as double dissociations. However, the validity 
of the “conscious/unconscious” distinction is a concep-
tual issue that is simply beyond the scope of the meas-
urement-theoretical arguments presented by Schmidt 
and Vorberg (2006). Whether or not the concept of 
unconscious processing will stand the test of time or 
be replaced by a different concept must be the out-
come, not the starting point, of scientific investigation. 
Dissociations at the measurement level provide tools 
for performing this investigation, and our analysis only 
shows which of these tools will work best in the widest 
range of situations.
Notes
1  For  formal  proofs  and  definitions,  please  refer  to 
Schmidt  and  Vorberg  (2006),  especially  the  math-
ematical appendix.
2 The regression technique advocated by Greenwald 
and  coworkers  (Draine  &  Greenwald,  1998; 
Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 1995) is an alterna-
tive method for demonstrating simple dissociations 
that has been strongly criticized on methodological 
and  conceptual  grounds  (Dosher,  1998;  Merikle  & 
Reingold,  1998;  Miller,  2000;  Schmidt  &  Vorberg, 
2006) and requires all the assumptions of the con-
ventional simple-dissociation logic in addition to the 
statistical ones introduced by the regression meth-
odology. Arguably, then, this method is worse than 
the original approach.
3 This exclusiveness assumption must not be confused 
with the one stated by Reingold and Merikle (1988). 
These authors propose that simple dissociations can be 
interpreted as evidence for unconscious processing only 
if the direct measure is both exhaustive and exclusive 
for conscious information. The latter requirement would 
be highly problematic because unconscious processing 
is probably a ubiquitous precursor to conscious process-
ing. Fortunately, from our analysis, it is sufficient that 
D be exhaustive for c or that I be exclusive for u – and 
note that these are alternative sets of assumptions that 
do not have to be met at the same time. Also note 
that the proofs given in our paper (Schmidt & Vorberg, 
2006)  are  more  general  than  those  in  Reingold  and 
Merikle (1988) because they do not assume additivity 
of conscious and unconscious effects.
4 In our paper, we discuss another type of dissociation, 
the sensitivity dissociation proposed by Reingold and 
Merikle (1988), which only requires the indirect meas-
ure to produce larger effects than the direct measure 
(Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). The assumptions under 
which this works are somewhat special, and this dis-
sociation is omitted here for brevity.
5 Historically, most studies have varied the physical en-
ergy of the prime (for instance, its contrast, intensity, 
or duration) to control its visibility. Such manipulations 
should  be  avoided  because  they  affect  priming  and 
visual awareness of the prime in similar ways. In par-
ticular, any disappearance of priming effects as prime 
energy is reduced does not constitute logically valid 
evidence against unconscious processing, because it 
cuts the necessary input to conscious and unconscious 
processes alike.
6 Note that cells left in the immediate wake of the feed-
forward sweep may pick up feedback very rapidly. The 
claim here is not that the entire system is feedback-
free for the duration of the feedforward sweep, but 
that the wavefront of the sweep travels just ahead of 
rapidly developing recurrent processes.
7 Reanalysis of the data reported in Schmidt (2002) 
confirmed these results, showing that the findings by 
Schmidt et al. (2006) are not acciden-tal.
8 The notion of a rapid chase is milder than that of a 
feedforward sweep: Whereas the feedforward sweep 
entails the possibility of rapid chases, the rapid chase Measuring unconscious cognition: Beyond the zero-awareness criterion
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account allows for local recurrent activity as long as 
sequential signals still lead to strictly sequential mo-
tor output. Therefore, rapid chases suggest but do not 
logically imply feedforward processing.
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